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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
In late 2006 and early 2007, Respondent SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC ("SilverWing") 
repeatedly met with Appellant Bonner County (the "County'') in connection with SilverWing's 
plans to develop a residential "fly-in, fly-out' ' property adjacent to the Sandpoint Airport 
operated by the County (the "Airport"). SilverWing's plans included the construction of a 
parallel taxiway entirely on its property to access the runway at the Airport. The County 
represented to SilverWing that the Federal Aviation Administration C •AA") had approved an 
Airport Layout Plan ("ALP") to buHd a parallel taxiway along the entire west side of the Airport 
and, based on that ALP, asked SilverWing to alter its taxiway construction plans to 
accommodate and facilitate the development of the west side taxiway. SilverWing relied on the 
County's representations to change its plans for the benefit of the County and built its taxiway 
partially on Airport property in conformity with the ALP at a significant increased cost to 
SilverWing. Thereafter, the County reversed its position and demanded that SilverWing remove 
the taxiway because the ALP it had provided to SilverWing to construct the taxiway had never 
been approved by the FAA. 
After attempts to resolve the matter failed, SilverWing sued the County for, inter alia, 
promissory estoppel. The County countersucd SilverW1ng alleging breach of contract. After 
more than a week of trial , a Bonner County jury found in favor of SilverWing on its promissory 
estoppel claim and held that the County failed to establish any breach of contract by SilverWing. 
Accordingly, the jury awarded SilverWing $250,000.00 in reliance damages and, later, the Court 
awarded SilvcrWing a total of $764;363 .32 in attorney's fees and costs. 1 Judge Richard 
Christensen denied the County's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV"). 
The County now appeals the district court's denial of its JNOV motion and that portion of the fee 
award related to SilverWing' s successful prosecution of its promissory estoppel claim. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. The County Operates the Sandpoint Airport Through its Airport Board. 
The County owns the Airpott and operates it through actions and recommendations of the 
Sandpoint Airport Advisory Board (the "Airport Board"). R. Exh. at 351 (Defendant Exh. A 7).2 
In addition, the County contracts with an individual to perform specific, designated services to 
operate and maintain the Airport under the title of Airport Manager. 
On May 31, 1996, the County entered into a contract with Robert Maurice entitled Lease 
of Airpo,1 Fixed-Base and Related Facilities (the "Airport Lease"). R. Exh. at 17-45 (Plaintiff 
Exh. 3). The Airport Lease specifically delegates certain responsibilities from the County to the 
Airport Manager (or "Tenant"). R. Exh. at 23, 26 (Plaintiff Exh. 3 at 7, 10). On June 5; 1996, 
Maurice, with the written approval of the County, assigned his rights and responsibilities under 
1 Of this total amount, the Court awarded $252,850.10 in attorney's fees to SilverWing for its 
successful defense of the County' s breach of contract claims. R. at 5862. The County has not 
appealed this portion of the award of fees to SilverWing. 
1 Both the County and Amicus cite to the "record" below, much of which was never seen or 
considered by the jury. Since this is an appeal of the district coutt's denial of the County's 
JNOV motion, SilverWing only cites to that evidence presented to the jury. SilverWing cites to 
the Amended Clerkjs Record on appeal with the abbreviation "R." and to the Amended Clerk's 
Record of Trial Exhibits with the abbreviation "R. Exh.," with a parallel citation to the exhibit 
number (e.g., Plaintiff Exh. 1). As multiple transcripts were prepared for this appeal; SilverWing 
cites to the trial transcript with the abbreviation "Trial Tr." 
2 
the Airport Lease to Jorge L. O'Leary ('~O,Leary"). R. Exh. at 46-49 (PlaintiffExh. 3) O'Leary 
served as Airport Manager from June 1996 to late 2008. Trial Tr. at 1081-82; 1087. During that 
time, O'Leary was the County's authorized agent to communicate with state and federal agencies 
on Airport matters; he maintained the Aiq,ort' s ALPs and correspondence from the FAA; and 
frequently acted as a liaison between the FAA and the County. Trial Tr. at 1082;20-1083:8, 
1095:10-1096:7. 
2. SilverWing Develops its Property Adjacent to Sandpoint Airport. 
In April 2006, SilverWing' s former principal John McKeown C'McKeown,,) purchased 
18. I acres of land adjacent to the west side of the Ai1l)0Jt (the 'Property')) and, thereafter, 
conveyed the Property to a new entity that became SilverWing. Trial Tr. at 264:24-268:7; 
269:18"271:3; 315:4-316:13 . SilverWing intended to design and construct a 45-Planned Unit 
Development ("PUD") of hangar structures for airplanes with residences (the "Development' ). 
R. Exh. at 101 , 127 (Plaintiff Exh. 36, 56). See also Trial Tr. 271 :4~272:4 (original intent was to 
"mirror what was being done at Gillespie [Field]" with upscale hangar homes); 298:17-21; 
578: 1-5. As planned, residents could taxi in their airplanes directly between the Airport runway 
and their hangar home. Id. Thus, a crucial component of this " t1y in/fly out' ' development was 
direct access to the Airport' s runway. Trial Tr. at 267:25-268:3; 865: 16-25. 
Included within SilverWing's purchase of the Property was a perpetual Taxi Way 
Easement from the County in favor of SilvcrWing for access from the Ptope1ty to the Airport' s 
runway at an access point in the middle of the runway or ''mid-field. '' Trial Tr. at 272-77; 
381 :23-382:2. R. Exh. at 50-67 (Plaintiff xh. 3~5) (hereinafter ' 'Easement"). The Easement and 
3 
access point to the runway made the SilverWing parcel particularly attractive because " it meant 
that if [SilverWing] built what [it] wanted to build, that the people that were part of [the] project 
that wanted to get their airplanes from their hangars to the runway could use that casement to get 
on the runway.' ' Trial Tr. at 267:25-268 :3. At the time, the Airport had at least six (6) separate 
mid-field access points to its runway, of which three (3) provided the only access from the west 
side of the Airport, including the one shared by SilverWing and Quest. Trial Tr. at 306: l 0-13. 
R. xh. at 83 (Plaintiff Exh. 32). 
Shortly after purchasing the Property, SilverWing hired an airport design expert to 
develop the architectural design and layout for the project. Trial Tr. at 277-80; R. Exh. at 362-63 
(Defendant Exh. A42). The initial site plan for the Property included a parallel taxiway entirely 
within the Property' s boundary lines. Trial Tt. at 83:22-24; 280-85; R. Exh. at 73 (Plaintiff Exh. 
21-A). The taxiway allowed Si l verWing residents to exit their property and make their way to 
the mid-field access point on the Airpmt runway provided by the Easement. Td. Upon learning 
of SilverWing's purchase of the Property, on June 22, 2006, the Airport Board requested that 
SilverWing provide it with "your plans for [the Property] and construction schedule" and 
informed SilverWing that " [ w ]e have been working with the FAA to install the west side taxi 
way." R. Exh. at 74-75 (Plaintiff xh. 21-B). SilverWing responded to the Airport Board by 
shaiing a copy of its initial site plan and noting, '~[a]s for the taxi way_, we think expanding the 
West Side taxi way is great." ld. at 74. 
As early as August 2006, SilverWing requested a copy of the cu1Tent ALP on file with 
the FAA for the Airport from the County's Airport Manager. Trial Tr. at 299:2-303:2, R. Exh. at 
4 
79-81 (Plaintiff Exh. 27, 28). See also rial r. at 301 :5-8 (''sometimes airports will have 
multiple ALP plans ... I just wanted the most recent one [ALP] because that's what we were 
going to develop off of'). An ALP is a survey that depicts, among other things, the location and 
nature of existing and proposed airport facilities and structures. Trial Tr. at 728:20-729:5; 1087. 
3, SilverWing Alters its Taxiway in Reliance on the County's Promises. 
After reviewing SilverWing's initial si te plan, the Airport Board was ••very much in favor 
of' the Development. Trial Tr. 491 :3-10. Beginning in September 2006, however, the County 
asked SilverWing to alter its plans to, instead, build its taxiway partia11y on Airport property to 
line up with the full west side taxiway depicted in ALP Alternative 2(B). Trial Tr. at 
312:1-313:1, R. Exh. at 98 (PlaintiffExh. 34). The County told SilverWing that they hoped that 
doing so would spur growth on the west side of the Airp01t and be consistent with a plan to build 
out the entire west side taxiway under A.LP Alternative 2(B). Trial Tr. at 324:3-14~ 332:9-18. At 
the time all of SilverWing's improvements were located within its Property lines, including its 
taxiway. Trial Tr. at 313: 18-315:3, R. Exh. at 101 (Plaintiff xh. 35). In response to this 
request, McKeown testified that he "was hesitant when they called me and they asked to do that; 
because when you do that, it was much more expensive taxiway." Ttial Tr. at 331 :11~16. 
On October 20, 2006, SilverWing hired Clearwater Engineering (Debbie Van Dyk 
hereinafter "Van Dyk") to design its Development, including, inter alla, the west parallel 
taxiway to connect its Development with the runway at the Airport Trial Tr. at 583: 18-5, 
R. Exh, at 85-97 (Plaintiff Exh. 33). Clearwater Engineering, in twn, hired ES Engineering 
(Corrie Esvclt-Siegford, hereinafter ~'Esvelt~Siegford") to perform specific Airport engineering 
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work on the SilverWing project. rial Tr. at 584:6-585:12; 715:5-12; 728:7-14; R. Exh. at 
102-12 (PlaintiffExh. 36). 
SilverWing's engineers began preliminary engmeenng for the Development by 
contacting the FAA. Trial Tr. at 586:3-590-18; R. Exh. at 379 (Defendant Exh, B8). The FAA 
indicated to Esvelt-Siegford on November 3_, 2006 that "the runway was not going to move." 
Trial Tr. at 732:20-733: 12; 783: 14-784: I ("this was preliminary engineering. Nothing at this 
point was set in stone'); R. Exh. at 117- 19 (Plaintiff •xh. 39). Thereafter, the engineers 
requested that the Airport Manager (O' eary) provide them with a FAA approved copy of the 
ALP for the Airport. 3 Trial Tr. at 579:5-580:6; 729:6-732:8 . On December 5, 2006, the Airport 
Manager provided Van Dyk with a hard copy of the ALP depicting Alternative 2(B) and a hard 
copy of the Environmental Assessment ("EA")4 done for the planned west side taxiway. Trial 
Tr. at 592:1-593:3, R. Exh. at 122 (Plaintiff Exh. 45) . In so doing; the Airport Manager 
specifically told Van Dyk Hthis is what you work from.'' Trial Tr. at 593 :4-11. Van Dyk 
testified that this was irnp01tant to her and that " [i]t would have been a huge red flat; if the 
Airport Manger had told her that she needed to wait for future approval of the ALP. Trial Tr. at 
593 :12-21. Given the assurances of the Airport Manager; SilverWing's engineers specifically 
relied upon this hard copy ALP to "site our taxiway, our parallel taxiway for the - and to lay out 
3 FAA expert Thomas Chastain testified that it was reasonable for SilvcrWing' s engineers to rely 
on the ALP they were given by the Airpott Manager, explaining, " [t]he airport manager 
represents the airport owner or sponsor. In this case the County." Trial Tr. at 1403:22-1404:5. 
4 The County' s Airport Engineer prepared the EA to assess the environmental impact of ALP 
Alternative 2(8). Trial Tr. at 581:20-583:17; 591 :1-11. •'[A] good po1tion of [the EA) had to do 
with putting in the west side taxiway . . .'' Trial Tr. at 582: 17-20. See also Trial Tr. 591 :5-7; 
591:11 ; 598:16-23. 
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the development of the SilverWing site." Trial Tr. at 732:1-5, 
After reviewing the ALP and EA provided by the Airport Manager, on December 7, 
2006, Van Dyk called the Airport Engineer (Napier) to discuss the location of the west side 
taxiway and the County s plans to move forward with ALP Alternative 2(B). Trial Tr. at 
594:24-596:7. The Airport Engineer confirmed that the County purchased $127,000.00 of 
wetlands credits to con:espond with Alternative 2(B) in the EA. Trial Tr. at 596:8-599: 1. Napier 
did not tell Van Dyk that ALP Alternative 2(B) had not been approved by the FAA or that 
SilverWing should wait for further approval. Trial Tr. at 599:5-7 . To the contrary, Van Dyk 
testified that had he done so, it would "[ d]efinitely be a red flag . ... if they weren't going 
forward with 2B or they hadn' t decided, if there was any indecision there., I would have called 
the client saying I think this is too risky; we need to wait and make sure they're going forward.'' 
Ttial Tr. at 599:14-19. 
Thereafter, McKeown requested a meeting with the Ait}J0rt Board because the 
Development was at the point where SilverWing was going to "process all the entitlements, 
spend a lot of money, and I wanted them [the Airpo1t Board] to just approve the project, assure 
that I was putting the taxiway in the right location." Trial Tr. at 344: 15-21; R. Exh. at 120 
(Plaintiff Exh . 40). McKeown prepared an agenda for that meeting, which included a specific 
item regarding "plans to improve the west side taxiway in front of our development.'' Trial Tr. at 
320:25-322:19; 323:22w324:14; R. xh. at 123 (Plaintiff Exh. 48). 
On December 11, 2006, McKeown, along with his engineers, met with the Airport Board 
(and the Airport Manager and Airport Engineer), and he brought the revised site plan for the 
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SilverWing Dt:velopment that showed the SilverWing taxiway moved to its new location 
consistent with ALP Altemative 2(B), "mostly" on Airport property. Trial Tr. at 325-329; 
R. Exh. at 388 (Defendant Exh. B 15). McKeown testified that the County specifically confirmed 
that SilverWing was placing its taxiway in the co1Tect location, according to the County's ALP 
Alternative 2(8). Trial Tr. at 331 :6-332:22. See also Trial Tr. at 344:4-345 :12. 
On December 12, 2006, McKcown sought additional assurances from the County that 
SilverWing should build its west side taxiway in the location shown on ALP Alternative 2(B). 
Trial Tr. at 336:4-337:18; R. Exh. at 124 (Plaintiff Exh. 53). On December 13; 2006, the Airpo1t 
Manager specifically infom1ed McKeown: "We would allow you to build inside our property 
line so that it aligns and conforms with where the taxiway should go for its future full length.'' 
Trial Tr. at 337:17-338:9; 346:17; R. Exh. at 124 (PlaintiffExh. 53). 
Sh01tly thereafter, McKeown brought a copy of his revised site plan to meet with Bonner 
County Commissioner Lewis Rich and the Airport Manager, Airport Engineer and Airpo1t Board 
to ' 'confirm exactly what he [Rich] wanted." Trial Tr. at 346:18-348:7. Commissioner Rich 
talked "at length" with McKeown about the location of the SilverWing taxiway and specifically 
assured him that it was placed in the CoU'ect location and "thanked [him] for doing it." Trial r. 
at 348:8~20. During the meeting, an issue had come up about the location of some equipment 
that needed to be moved, so McKeown asked the Airpo1t Manager and Airport Engineer to go to 
the Property to show him what equipment they were talking about and to confinn the location 
that the taxiway should be built. Trial Tr. at 348:22~349:18, TI1e Airport Engineer brought a 
copy of ALP Alternative 2(8), and the three men walked the SilverWing Property to, once again; 
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contmn the co1Tect location of SilverWing's planned taxiway consistent with ALP Alternative 
2(B). Trial r. at 349: 19-351 :2. At no point during this walk through did either the Airport 
Manager or Airport Engineer tell McKeown that SilverWing should not build its taxiway in the 
location consistent with ALP Altemativc 2(B). Trial Tr. at 351 :3-13. 
Based on the above repeated and consistent assurances by the County, SilverWing agreed 
to revise its site plan to place its taxiway "mostly'' on Airport property in a location consistent 
with ALP Alternative 2(8). See Trial Tr. at 326:11-328:7; R. Exh. at 388 (Defendant Exh. B'I 5). 
4. The County Reviews and Continues to Approve SiJverWing's Altered Plans. 
SilverWing was required to submit two fonns to the FAA for approval of its 
Development: (1) Form 7480 - Notice of Landing Arca Proposal (" Form 7480") that dealt with 
SilverWing's proposed taxiway given that it was now going to be hujlt partially on Airport 
property; and (2) Form 7460 - Notice of Proposed Construction and Alteration ("Form 7460") 
that dealt with the structures at the Development off Airport property. Trial Tr. at 740: 15-744:5 . 
On January 22i 2007, SilverWing sent the County its detailed plans via Form 7480 and 
Form 7460. Trial Tr. at 745: 16-22. Both Forms specifically relied on, and attached, ALP 
Alternative 2(B). Trial Tr. at 744:2-15. SilverWing was required to submit such plans through 
the Airport Manager, not directly to the •AA. Trial Tr. at 744: 16-745:15. The County's Airport 
Manager and Airp01t Engineer reviewed SilverWing's 7480 and 7460 Fonns and, on January 31, 
2007, provided substantive comments on them. R. Exh. at 156~60 (Plaintiff Exh. 62 and 65); 
Trial Tr. at 745:16-748:2. SilverWing incorporated the County's comments into a final draft and 
sent them back to the County on the same day. R. Exh. at 144. 55 (PlaintiffExh. 60 and 61)~ Trial 
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Tr. at 748:3-749:14. On Febrnary 14, 2007, the Airport Manager provided SilverWing with 
additional comments on the FAA Fom1s and indicated that he would submit them to the AA. 
R. Exh. at 161 -63 (Plaintiff Exh. 68 and 69). T1ial Tr. at 749:15-754:5. Throughout this 
process, the County never informed Si.lverWing that the taxiway was incorrectly located because 
it was based on an unapproved ALP. Trial Tr. at 747:21-24. Instead, on February 14, 2007, the 
County, as Airport Sponsor, submitted SilverWing's Fonn 7480 and Fonn 7460, which were 
based on and attached ALP Altemative 2(8), to the AA for approval, stating it had "no 
objection" to the submission. R. Ex.h. at 164 (Plaintiff Exh. 70). Trial Tr. at 718: 16-23 ; 
754:3-755: I 6. 
On April 30, 2007, the FAA informed the County that it had reviewed SilverWing's 
Forn1 7480 (taxiway) and indicated that "we have no objection to its construction, provided that 
the taxiway design standards meet FAA Advisory Circular 150/5300-13, Airport Design." Trial 
Tr. at 756:6-757:6; R. Exh. at 200 (Plaintiff Exh. 8 1). Shortly th(jreafter; on May 3, 2007, the 
FAA approved SilverWing's Fann 7460 for construction of its Development. Trial Tr. at 
759:6-10; R. Exh. at 201 -02 (Plaintiff Exh. 84). 
On May 31 ; 2007, SilverWing's engineers sent the FAA additional plans it had requested 
conl;eming the taxiway construction and infom1ed the FAA that an environmental checklist was 
not needed because the County already completed, and the l•AA approved, the EA for the full-
length taxiway shown on ALP Alternative 2(B). R. Exh. at 203 (Plaintiff Exh. 88). On July 11 , 
2007, the FAA infom1ed svelt-Siegford that the FAA had received and reviewed SilverWing's 
taxiway plans and that SilverWing could move forward with the taxiway construction. R. Exh. 
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at 204-05 (Plaintiff Exh. 89). 
Beginning in September 2007, SilverWing constntcted a 1 i098-foot taxiway partially on 
Airport prope1ty consistent with ALP Alternative 2(8) at a cost of approximately $851,120.00. 
Trial Tr. at387:8- 19; 763:15-19; 943 :22-944:4~R. Exh. at317-1 8 (Plaintiffs Exh. 177 and 178.) 
Doing so, rather than constructing the taxiway solely on SilverWing's property as it initially 
planned, caused SilverWing to incur significantly more cost and expense because of the 
increased requirements for on-Airport constmction. Trial Tr. at 331: 10~23. 
5. Tho County Supports SilverWing's~ Development. 
In early January 2007, SilverWing; prepared and submitted its conditional use, 
subdjvision and planned unit development applications to the City of Sandpoint. Trial Tr. at 
351 -58; R. Exh. at 127~43 (Plaintiff Exh. 56, 57 and 58). Each one of these applications was 
specifically based on the ALP depicting Alternative 2(8) and explained: "A partial parallel 
taxiway that is pmt of Sandpoint Airport' s Master P1an will be constructed within 7.5 ' of the 
parcel 's east boundary with the remainder on Bonner County property." R. Exh. at 128, 135, 141 
(Plaintiff Exh. 56, 57 and 58). 
On February 20, 2007, the Sandpoint Planning Commission met to consider SilverWing's 
applications. R. Exh. at 165-71 (Plaintiff Exh. 71). Duringthis meeting, both the Chainnan ofthe 
Airport Board and Airport Manager testified in support of SilverWing' s applications. Trial Tr. at 
3 59-61; R. Exh. at 168 (Plaintiff Exh. 71 ). Moreover, when specifically asked whether the 
Development would impact the long tenn development of the Airport, Airport Board Chainnan 
Terry McConaughey ("McConaughey") responded, "there are no plans for major developments 
11 
for runway length, except for the taxi way on the left side, which SilverWing is developing 
within FAA g-uidelines.'' R. Exh. at 168 (Plaintiff Exh. 71). The Sandpoint Planning 
Commission approved SilvcrWing' s PUD. R. Exh. at 170-71 (Plaintiff Exh. 71 ). 
On March 21 , 2007, McConaughey attended a Sandpoint City Council meeting wherein 
SilverWing' s PUD (based on ALP Alternative 2(8)) was considered. R. Exh. at 174-81 (Plaintiff 
Exh. 75); Trial Tr. 362-65. Again, McConaughey testified that he "suppot1s the project." R. Exh. 
at 177 (Plaintiff Exh. 75). The City of Sandpoint unanimously approved SilverWing's PUD. 
R. Exh. at 179-81 (Plaintiff Exh. 75). SilverWing began construction of its Development in 
September 2007. Trial Tr. at 763: 15-19. Through December 3 1, 2008, SilverWing conducted 
significant development work at its Property, including grading all 45 lots, utility work, fencing, 
paving streets and building its taxiway, at a total cost of $5,723,120.00. Trial Tr. at 387:8-19; 
943:22-944:4; R. Exh. at 317 (Plaintiff Exh. 177). 
6. The Parties Enter into a Through The Fence Airport Access Agreement. 
Although SilverWing already had runway access rights under its Easement, SilverWing 
decided to enter into a Through the Fence Airport Access Agreement ("TTFA'') with the County, 
in part, to help share the costs associated with Airport access. Trial Tr. at 378-380; 475:9-21; 
R. Exh. at 193.99 (Plaintiff Exh. 76). In April 2007, SilverWing and the County negotiated the 
TTFA to grant SilverWing a perpetual right to access the Airport ' s runway in private aircraft 
from the Prope1iy for a yearly fee. Trial Tr. at 378-83. 
The Airport Board approved the TTF A on April 16, 2007, and sent it to the County 
Commissioners with a recommendation to approve it. R. Exh. at 192 (Plaintiff xh. 76). On 
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April 27, 2007, County Commission Chainnan Lewis Rich executed the TTFA on behalf of the 
County, which Included the County' s specific acknowledgment that "the Licensee is constructing 
44 residential airplane hangars." R. Exh. at 195, 198 (Plaintiff Exh. 76). It was the Countis 
responsibility to get the TTF A approved by the FAA. Trial Tr. at 13 72: 14-17. 
Subsequently, the Aill)Ort Manager sent the partially executed TTFA to the FAA for 
review and approval, and on May 3 2007, the FAA responded that it considered residential use 
adjacent to a public airpott to be an incompatible use and "encouraged" the County to "ensure 
through your TTF Agreement that access is not provided to hangars with residences."' R. Exh. at 
201 -02 (Plaintiff Exh. 84). The FAA never approved the TTFA. R. Exh. at 232 (Plaintiff Exh. 
109). Nonetheless, on May 10, 2007, the County sent SilverWing the TTFA, along with a cover 
letter stating: .1Enclosed are two copies of the revised through-the-fence agreement that the 
Commissioners signed reflecting the changes made by the Airpott Advisory Board. Please 
retum one copy to us. The other copy if [sic] for you to retain for your records." R. Exh. at 191 
(Plaintiff Exh. 76). The County did not infonn SilverWing that the FAA had not approved the 
TTFA. Trial Tr. at 384-85. On June 6, 2007, SilverWing ex.ecuted the TTFA, as requested by 
the County. R. Exh. at 198 (Plaintiff Exh. 76); Trial Tr. 385. 
7. The FAA Places the Airport on "Non-Compliance" Status. 
In December 2008, the FAA placed the Airpo1t on '"non-compliance" status because the 
County had; (1) on May 25, 2000, prior to SilverWing's purchase of the Property in 2006, 
granted the Easement without FAA approval; (2) entered into the TTFA with SilverWing 
allowing residential "through the fence" access to the runway· and (3) allowed numerous private 
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property owners mid-field access to the mnway at the Airpott. R. Exh at 242-52 (Plaintiff Exh. 
115); R. Exh. at 30 l -04 (Plaintiff Exh. 142). 
1n January 2009, the County implemented a Corrective Action Plan (the "CAP") in an 
effort to get the Airport back into compliance. R. Exh. at 235-38 (Plaintiff Exh. I IO). Among 
other things, the CAP sought to: (I) "pursue[] all avenues to extinguish the perpetual nature of 
the SilverWings TTF easement;" and (2) "pursue[] an amendment to the Silverwing and Quest 
TTF agreement to require access only to the end of the runway; midfield access is unacceptable 
from a safety perspective.'' Id. at 236. See also Appellant Br. at 8 n.5. The CAP was partially 
accepted by the • AA in February 2009. R. Exh. at 398 (Defendant Exh. 03 ). 
On March 25, 2009, the FAA notified the County that the SilverWing taxiway was not 
constrncted based on an "approved ALP." R. Exh. at 241 (Plaintiff Exh. t 14). The FAA further 
stated that if "the taxiway was constrnctcd in the incorrect location, then SilverWing needs to 
have a plan to relocate the taxiway, when the nmway is shifted." Id. McKeown testified this 
was the first time he was made aware of the fact that ALP Alternative 2(8) had not been 
approved by the FAA. Trial Tr. at 413:4-414: 15. Indeed, he testified that he was ''shocked and 
infuriated" at the news. rial Tr. at 414: l6-l 7. 
8. Silvct·Wing Works With the County to Address FAA Concerns. 
SilverWingwas unaware of the FAA's concerns with its Development until the County's 
designated FAA liaison, Chris Popov, infonned them of such. Trial Tr. at 403:10-406:21. 
Immediately thereafter and continuing through 2011, SilverWing worked with the County and 
the FAA to resolve the County s non-compliance status. Trial Tr. at 4 12 :4-413: l. See aMo Tiial 
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Tr. at l 022: 19-1033 :20 (SilverWing hired FAA specialty counsel to work with the FAA). 
ln March 20 l I , the FAA's interim policy allowing existing residential developments with 
through the fence access went into effect, 76 Fed. Reg. 15,028 (Mar. 18, 2011), rende1ing 
SilverWing's access FAA compliant. R. Exh. at 402 (Defendant Exh. E40); Trial Tr. at 
416 :11-17; 1063:20-22. On October 11 , 2011, the County approved an amended ALP moving 
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the runway and taxiway 60 feet to the west and acquiring all or some of the SilverWing 
Development. Trial Tr. at 424:22-425:19; R. Exh. at 253 (Plaintiff Exh. 121). McKeown 
testified that this ALP " ripped up all my front lots, it ripped up all my taxiways, interior, and it 
ripped up the taxiway I built on behalf of the County." Trial r. at 425:16- 19. The FAA 
approved the amended ALP on October 24, 2011. Id. The County' s FAA liaison (Popov) 
testified that " the biggest issue'' of the CAP was the County' s seeking to "te1minate and 
extinguish" Si.lverWing s access rights to thenmway. Trial Tr. at 1363:25-1364:10. 
In February 2012, the FAA informed the County that it was tentatively placing the 
Airport back into compliance conditioned on the Airport continuing to pursue items in its CAP, 
including extinguishing SilverWing)s Easement and modifying its TTFA. Trial Tr. at 426:2-14; 
1369:22-24. In 2012, Congress passed legislation rescinding t11e previous prohibition on 
residential through-the-fence access agreements. Pub. L. 112-95 § 136, 126 Stat. 23-24 
(amending 49 U.S.C. § 47107); Trial Tr. at 1369:22-1379:3 . 
9. Three Yeat·s Aftc.r this Lawsuit was Initiated, the County Gets FAA 
Approval of New ALP. 
In 2015, the FAA sif:,1ned a new ALP for the Airport. Trial Tr. at 472 :10-17; 1262:6-2 1; 
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1370:4~ 11. According to the County, this ALP ''is in complete conformity with the SilverWing 
development as built." Appellant Br. at 9. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
1. SilyerWing Sues the County and the County Removes Case to Federal Court. 
On May 11 , 2012, SilverWing initiated this matter by filing its Complaint, which pled 
three counts against Bonner County: (1) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
(2) Taking Without Compensation - Inverse Condemnation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 
(3) Violation of Equal Protection pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. R. at 40. The case began in the 
district court in Bonner County, and the County removed it to the U.S. District Court for the 
District ofidaho on June 6, 201 2. R. at 86. 
2. Judge Lodge Denies the County Summary Judgment on SilvcrWing's 
P1·on1issory Estoppel Claim and Remands Claim to State Coul't. 
The parties engaged in extensive discovery, and on October 16, 20 13, SilverWing 
amended its Complaint to add a fourth count for promissory estoppel. R. at 268. The County 
sought summary judgment on all four of SilverWing's claims based on federal preemption. On 
November 21 , 2014, the court granted the County's motion for summary judgm~nt wHh respect 
to tlJe first three counts of SilvcrWing's Amended Complaint but denied summary judgment as 
to the fourth count for promissory estoppel. As explained by Judge Edward Lodge: 
Having undertaken a lengthy review of the record in this case, the 
Court finds SilverWing's claim for breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is preempted by federal law but its claim of 
promissory estoppel is not. The difference between the two claims 
lies in the allegations giving rise to each. Unlike the breach claim, 
the promissory estoppel claim 1s based on allegations that do not 
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involve interference with federal laws and reglllations sufficiently 
to fall within the scope of the preempted field. 
The promissory estoppel claim centers around allegations 
llivolving the County's representations to SilverWing upon which 
SilverWing relied in moving forward with the proposed 
development and expending a great deal of money. In particular, 
SilverWing' s claims that the County failed to provide SilverWing 
with the current/co1Tect ALP, the County repeatedly assured 
SilverWing that the alternative 2(8) layout would be used, the 
County allegedly requested that the West Taxiway be placed where 
SilverWing built it, and the County fai led to get FAA approval for 
the TTF Agreement. Those representations occutTed prior to the 
FAA's involvement and enforcement of its regulations. The fact 
that the FAA later detennined the Airpo1t was not in compliance 
does not mean the County may not be liable for any 
misrepresentations it made to SilverWing and/or its conduct in its 
dealings with SilverWing. As such, the Court denies the Motion 
for Summary Judgment as to the Promissory Estoppel claim. 
SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner C(v., 2014 WL 6629600, at *10 (D. Idaho Nov. 21, 
2014), aj]'d; 700 F. App'x 7'15 (9th Cir. 20 17); see also R. at 5746-47. On January 21, 2015, the 
federal court remanded SilverWing's promissory estoppel claim to state court. R. at 159. 
3. SilverWing Prevails in its Defense of the County's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Back in state court, on May 1, 2015, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings 
and subsequently filed its second motion for summary judgment on SilverWing s promissory 
estoppel claim. R. at 168, 220. On April 13, 2016, the district court denied both motions, finding 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the County made a promise to SilverWing and 
whether it was reasonable for SilverWing rely on the County's promise. R. at 3073 . 
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4. The County Asserts Counterclaims, and SilverWing Moves for Summary 
Judg___ment. 
On March 3i 2016, the County amended its Answer to assert counterclaims against 
SilverWing for: (1) Breach of Contract; and (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, related to the parties' TTF A. R. at 2985-3006. SilverWing subsequently moved for 
summary judgment on the counterclaims. R. at 3075. On September 8, 2016) the court granted 
SilverWing's motion in part, dismissing three of the County's five theories of breach of contract 
and dismissing the County' s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in its entirety. R. at 3314-3327. 
5. SilverWing Prevails at Trial in Bonner County. 
On November 15, 2016, a six-day jury trial commenced on SilverWint s promissory 
estoppel claim and the County's breach of contract counterclaim in Bonner County. Trial Tr. at 
2:4-10. The jury found for SilverWing on its promissory estoppel claim and awarded it 
$250,000.00 in out-of-pocket reliance damages. Trial Tr. at 1577-79. The jury also determined 
SilverWing did not breach the TTFA. id. Specifically, the jury returned the following Verdict on 
Special Interrogatories on SilverWing's promissory estoppel claim: 
Question No. 1: Did the County make one or more promises to 
SilverWing? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes[✓] No [ ] 
Question No. 2: Did SilverWing rely on such promise or promises 
by acting, or not, to its detriment? 
Answel' to Question No. 2: Yes[·✓] No [ ] 
Question No. 3: Was SilverWing's reliance on the promise, or 
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promises1 foreseeable, or should it have been foreseeable to the 
County? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes[✓] No [ ] 
Question No. 4: Was SilverWing's reliance on the promise~ or 
promises, reasonable? 
Answer to Question No. 4: Yes[✓] No [ ] 
Question No. 5: What is the amount of out-of~pocket damages, if 
any, sustained by SilverWing as a result of its reliance on Bonner 
County's promise or promises from October 25 2006 through 
December 31 , 2008? 
Answer to No. 5: $250,000.00. 
R. at 4901; see also R. at 4906. 
The County moved for JNOV on SilverWing' s promissory estoppel claim. R. at 4908. 
On March I 7, 2017, the court denied the- County's JNOV motion. R. at 5727-48 . The County 
timely filed its original Notice of Appeal on April 14, 2017 . R. at 5821 . 
6. The District Court Awards Silvcr·Wing its Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Following extensive b1iefing by the pmiies, the district court entered its Memorandum 
Decision on Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees. R. at 5836. Therein, the court 
concluded that SilverWing was the prevailing party in the state court action and was entitled to 
its fees and costs. The court awarded SilverWing $48,883. 19 for its costs as a matter of right and 
$704,024.63 for its reasonable attorney fees. R. at 5863. Of this total amount, $445,622.40 in 
attorney fees was awarded to SilverWing for prosecution of its promissory estoppel claim, 
$252,850.10 for its successful defense of the County's counterclaims, and $5,552.13 for legal 
research. R. at 5862. · he court also awarded SilvcrWing an additional $11,458.50 for its fees 
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related to supplemental briefing on an issue raised by the County at oral argument. R. at 5862, 
5875. On June 9, 2017, the court entered Judgment against the County for SilverWing's attorney 
fees and costs in the total amount of $764,363.32. R. at 5875. 
On July 13, 2017, the County filed its Amended Notice of Appeal. R. at 5878. On 
August 11 , 20 17, this Court granted the Idaho Association of Counties ' motion to file Amicus 
Curiae Brief. The County filed its Appellant's Brief on November 16, 2017 (''Appellant Br."). 
The Idaho Association of Counties also filed its Amicus Curiae Brief on November 16, 2017 
C'Amicus Br."). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In its Appellant's Brief, the County asserts three issues on appeal. SilverWing restates the 
issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying the County's JNOV motion; 
2. Whether the district court erred in awarding SilverWing its reasonable attorney 
fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) for its successful promissory estoppel claim; and 
3. Whether the County is entitled to an award of its attomey fees and costs incurred 
in the district court and on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-117 and/or under the TTFA. 
In addition, SilverWing asserts the following issue on appeal ; 
4. Whether SilverWing is entitled to its attorney fees and costs on appeal under 
(daho Code § 12~ 120(3 ). 
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111. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
A decision on a motion for JNOV under l.R.C.P. 50(b) is a pure question of law and, 
therefore, the standard is one of free review. This Cou1t applies the same standard as the district 
court when ruling on the JNOV motion- whether substantial evidence supports the jury's 
verdict. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 428, 196 P .3d 341, 346 (2008). Thus, the 
question here "is whether ' g1ving deference to the distlict cou1t and drawing al1 inferences in 
favor of the jury's verdict, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict."' 
Id. (citations omitted). See also Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471 , 476, 259 P.3d 617, 622 
(2011) (on a JNOV motion, ••the moving party admits any adverse facts, and the Cou1t must 
draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonrnoving pmty"). By substantial, it is not 
meant that the evidence is uncontracted, but that it is of sufficient quantity and probative value 
that reasonable minds could conclude that the jury's verdict was proper. Lanham v. Idaho Power 
Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495-96, 943 P .2d 912, 921 -22 (1997). "In reviewing a grant or denial of a 
motion for JNOV the court may not reweigh evidence, consider witness credibility, or compare 
its factual findings wit11 that of the jury." Hall v. Farmers All. Mut. Ins. Co. , 145 Idaho 313,324, 
179 P.3d 276, 287 (2008). 
B. Attorney Fees and Costs. 
The award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the distdct court and will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Idaho Transp. Dep 't v. Ascorp, Inc. , 159 Idaho 
138, 140, 357 P.3d 863 , 865 (2015). o assess an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the 
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tlu-ee 9 factor test: ''(I) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available l{) it; and (3) whether the trial court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, 154 Idaho 549, 
554,300 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2012). Significantly, " [t]he burden of showing the trial court abused 
its discretion rests with the appellant.)' Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451 456, 95 P.3d 69, 74 
(2004) . "Whether an action is based on a commercial transaction is a question oflaw over which 
this Court exercises free review.;; Idaho Transp. Dep 1t, 159 Idaho at 140, 357 P.3d at 865. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Distl'ict Court's Denial of the County's JNOV Motion Must be Affirmed 
Because Substantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Jury's Verdict. 
In denying the County s JNOV motion) the district court found that ' the jury's verdict is 
based on substantial and competent evidence." R . at 5741. As set fmth below, this finding is 
supported by substantial evidence; particularly when all adverse inferences from the:;: evidence are 
taken in the light most favorable to SilverWing. 
1. SilverWing's Promissoi·y Estoppel Claim is Not Based on Ac~ess Rights 
Created Under the TTFA and, Therefore, Not Barred by Its Existence, 
Here, as below, the County argues that SilverWing's promissory estoppel claim is barred 
because the promises made by the County to SilverWing are encompassed within the TTFA. See 
Appellant Br. at 12~16. This argument is not supported by the County' s authority or the 
evidence presented at trial. 
First, none of the cases cited by the County apply to the facts of this case. Appellant Br. 
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at 13-14. In Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat 'I Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P .3d 1104 (2005), a bank 
argued that the statute ot frauds rendered an alleged promise to lend money to plaintiff 
unenforceable. The plaintiff attempted to invoke promissory estoppel to prevent the bank from 
denying the enforceability of its oral promise to lend him money. Id. This Court noted that 
because the promise did not comply with the statute of frauds, "there was not a complete promise 
.. . to be enforced.'' Id. at 367, I 09 P.3d at 1109. ln contrast, here, the jury found that 
SilverWing reasonably relied upon complete promises made by the County to its detriment, 
causing it to suffer economic damage. R. at 4901 -4903 . 
Similarly, in Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n v. State, 154 Idaho 716,723,302 P.3d 341 348 
(2012), the plaintiff based its promissory estoppeJ claim on a letter that did not contain a 
promise. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of evidence of a promise and this Court 
affirmed. Id. In contrast, here, the jury heard testimony from McKeown and his engineers and 
reasonably concluded that complete promises were made. R. at 4901. 
•inally, in Zollinger v. Carroll, 137 Idaho 397, 49 P.3d 402 (2002), this Court affirmed 
the district court's finding that defendants had made no promises and that the conesponding 
contracts were illegal. 137 Idaho at 398, 49 P.3d at 403 . Here, SilverWing is not attempting to 
enforce a contract (illegal or otherwise) between two other people for its benefit. Accordingly, 
the cases cited by the County are inapplicable. 
Second, the factual record below makes clear. that the County' s promises to SilverWing 
about ALP Alternative 2(8) and where to build its taxiway are independent and separate from 
the TTF A concerning midfield access rights. ln order for the County' s promises to SilverWing 
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to be encompassed within the TTFA, the TT ·A would have had to contemplate the 
Development's location and/or a particular ALP - which it did not. As the district court noted, 
'[w]hcrc the airport layout plan called for Plaintiff's development (be it adjacent to, or very far 
away from; the runway) is independent from whether planes coming from such development had 
pennission to access the airport runway, and if so, at what cost. H R. at 5734. 
Unlike in Lettunich where the agent promised the principal would enter into the contract 
(and provide plaintiff with a loan), here the County's agents promised, not that the principal 
would enter into the TTF A, but that the Development Coffesponded with the correct ALP. This 
case would be more like Lettunich if o• eary promised SilverWing the County would enter into 
the TTF A, but thereafter the County decided not to, and in the interim SilverWing relied on 
O'Learis promise and began developing to its economic detriment. Instead, O'Leary and 
Airport Board members promised SilverWing its Development plan conformed to the proper 
ALP, and the taxiway was in the proper location. Thereafter in a separate time and place, the 
parties entered into a contract that permitted SilverWing- independent of its Development's 
configuration- access to the Airpoti runway for an annual fee. Under these circumstances, the 
dishict court held '(c]ontracting access rights with a developer does not cure inaccurate 
assertions and promises unrelated to the tenns of that contract." R. at 5734. 
The County argues that the TTFA' s inclusion of a map of the Airport (Exhibit A to the 
TTF A) indicates that the TTF A' s scope includes promises about the layout of the Airport. 
Appellant Br. at 6-7, 15-16. In interpreting conh'actual lang11age, courts begin with the language 
of the contract -itself~ Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz1 144 Idaho 304,308, 160 P.3d 743 1 
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747 (2007). The TTFA's reference to Exhibit A is preceded by a paragraph entitled "Access to 
Airport." R. Exh. at 194 (Plaintiff Exh. 76). Moreover, the TTFA provides that "Bonner County 
hereby grants to [SilverWing] access to the Airp01t in private aircrafl. at the location designated 
in Exhibit 'A' attached hereto and made a part of by this reference," Id. hus, it is clear that 
Exhibit A is included to show where the access rights were being b1ranted. Because there are no 
tem1s in the Tr FA specifically indicating the parties are bow1d to follow a particular layout plan, 
the County's previous promises made about layout plans are unrt::lated. This conclusion is 
consistent with the testimony at trial from numerous witnesses, including McKeown and fonncr 
Commission.er Joe Young, that the TTFA is- as labeled-an access agreement (see R. Exh. at 
191-99 (Plaintiff Exh. 76); Trial Tr. at 38 1 :3-382:2) and that SilverWing understood it to be 
limited to providing runway access at the midfield access point designated on Exhibit A. See R. 
Exh. at 199 (Plain ti ff Exh. 76); rial Tr. at 4 75 :9-4 78: 1. 
The district court considered the County' s arguments herein and methodically reviewed 
the evidence presented at trial and held that "[t]he legal defense that a written contract precludes 
claims for promissory estoppel on the same subject matter of such contract does not tactually, 
legally or equitably apply to the promises and contract in this case." R. at 5735-36. Substantial 
evidence supports this conclusion and, therefore, it should be affirmed. 
SilvcrWing Presented Substantial Evidence at Trial to Support the Jury's 
Verdict Awarding SJlverWing Reliance Damages. 
The County contends that the district court en-ed in denying its Motion for JNOV because 
there is not substantial evidence to support each of the elements of Si lverWing's promissory 
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estoppel claim. Appellant Br. at l 6-23. As set forth below, this claim is without merit. 
a. Silver Wing Pre.wmtecl Substantial Evidence of Promises at Trial. 
The jury was instructed that a "promise' is defined as the "manifestation of an intention 
to act or refrain from acting in a specified manner, conveyed in such a way that another is 
justified in understanding that a commitment has been made; it is a person's assurance that the 
person will or will not do something," R. at 5914 (Jury Instmction No. 6). See PROMISE, 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). At trial, SilverWing presented substantial evidence 
that the County, through its agents, in 2006 and 2007 made specific promises to McKeown and 
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SilverWing' s engineers, that: (1) the ALP provided to SilverWing in 2006 depicting Alternative 
2(B) was the ALP upon which SilverWing should base the plans for its Development, and (2) the 
west parallel taxiway designed and constructed by SilverWing was in the correct location. See, 
e.g., Trial Tr. at 330:20-332:22 (McKeown received assurances and commitments from Airport 
Board about proper location to build SilverWing taxiway); 335: 10-338:9 (O' Leary confirmed the 
County's assurance to SHverWing that it should build its taxiway consistent with ALP 
Alternative 2(8)); 344: 15-345:12 (McKeown received assurances from AirpOlt Board that plan 
to build taxiway pmtially on County property consistent with ALP Alternative 2(B) was 
;•appropriate and correct to go forward with''); 345 :20-346:23 (O' Leary confirmed assurance that 
SilvcrWing should build taxiway consistent with ALP Alternative 2(B)); 348:8-20 
(Commissioner Rich gave commitment to Si lverWing that it should build taxiway consistent 
with ALP Alternative 2(8)); 350:23-351 :13 (Napier and O' Leary assured SilverWing that 
taxiway should be built in location consistent with ALP Alternative 2(8))~ 359: 1 1-19 
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(McConaughey and O'Leary testify at Sandpoint City Commission to assure Commission that 
SilverWing project consistent with approved ALP); 360:12-361:15 (id.); 738:3-740:6, 744 :1 2-
745:3, 747:17-748:2, 754:3-22 (Esvelt-Siegford tlial testimony regarding promises made by 
County); 592:1-593 :21 ,599:2-24 (Van Dyk trial testimony regarding promises made by County) 
Compare Gilbert v. Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 391, 732 P.2d 355, 360 (Ct App. 1987) ("as good 
as'' statements were "indications of hope or expectation'' and not binding commitments). 
The County ignores this evidence and would have this Court believe that it did nothing 
more than "mistakenly provide[] SilverWing with incorrect information regarding the plans for 
the Airport." Appellant Br. at 18. As shown above, the County did substantially more than that-
it repeatedly and consistently made assurances and conunitments to SilverWing about where to 
place its taxiway and upon which ALP to base its Development. When viewed in the light most 
favorable to SilverWing; this certainly amounts to ' substantial evidence" that would support the 
jury's finding that the County made '•one or more promises to SilverWing." See R. at 4901 . 
b. SilverWing Pre:,·ented Substantial Evidence of Reasonable Reliance at 
Trial. 
Focusing on Defendant's Exhibit B9 (R. Exh. 380), the County argues that SilverWing's 
engineers decided on November 31 2006 to use the ALP Alternative 2(B) based on a single 
conversation with the FAA and, therefore, could not reasonably rely on anything said by the 
County thereafter. Appellant Br. at 19-2 l . This argument directly contradicts the testimony of 
SilverWing;s engineers and evidence presented at bial, including: 
November 3, 2006 - Esvelt-Siegford speaks to FAA and emails Van Dyk a summary of 
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their conversation. Esvelt-Siegford testifies that this was preliminary engineering and there is a 
lot of work to be done. R. Exh. at 380 (Defendant Exh. B9); Trial Tr. at 783: 14-784: l. 
December 5, 2006 - Airpo1t Manager (O'Leary) gives Van Dyk a large scale, hard copy 
of the cunent ALP for Airport and copy of EA- both show ALP depicting Alternative 2(B). 
R. xh. at 122 (Plaintiff Exh. 45); Trial Tr. at 592:3-593:21. Shortly thereafter, Van Dyk 
confirms with Airport Engineer (Napier) that the County is purchasing $127,000.00 in wetlands 
credits to follow EA requirements for ALP Alternative 2(8). Trial Tr. at 594:24-599:24. 
December 11, 2006 - Van Dyk, Esvelt-Siegford and McKeown meet wlth the Airport 
Board, Airport Manager and Airport Engineer for a presentation on the SilverWing project and 
its proposed taxiway design. Everyone assures SilverWing that it should build its taxiway based 
on the ALP depicting Alternative 2(B). R. Exh. at 123 (Plaintiff Exh. 48); Trial Tt- at 
344:4-345: I 2 (McKeown), 60 l: 14-603: L 7 (Van Dyk), 738 :3-740:6 (Esvelt-Siegford). 
January 22, 2007 through February 14, 2007 - Esvelt-Siegford gives Airport Manager 
(O;Leary) dra[ts of the FAA Fonns 7460 and 7480 for FAA approval of SilverWing's 
Development and taxiway. Both forms attach the ALP depicting Alternative 2(8). Trial Tr. at 
744:2-746:2. Airport Manager and Airport Engineer provide her with substantive comments to 
the draft FAA Forms. Neither of them tells her that the Forms are based on the wrong ALP. 
R. Exh. at 156-60 (Plaintiff Exh. 62 and 65); Trial Tr. at 746:6-748:2. Esvelt-Siegford finalh:es 
the FAA Forms, incorporating the substantive comments from the County, and mails them to the 
Airport Manager. R. Exh. at 144-55 (Plaintiff Exh. 60 and 61); Trial. Tr. at 748:3-749:14. He 
provides additional comments on the FAA Fonns and states he will mail the Forms to the FAA. 
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R. Exh. at 161-63 (Plaintiff Exh. 68 and 69); Trial Tr. at 750:20-754:5. 
February 14, 2007 - Airport Manager (O'Leary) mails the 7460 and 7480 Forms to the 
FAA on behalf of the County as Airpo1t Sponsor for the Airport, stating the Airport has "no 
objection" to the Fonns. Both orms attach the ALP depicting Altemati ve 2(B). R. Exh. at I 64 
(Plaintiff Exh. 70). 
AJxil 30, 2007 - The FAA approves SilverWing's Form 7480 for construction of the 
taxiway. R. Exh. at 200 (PlaintiffExh. 81). 
May 3, 2007 - The FAA approves SilverWing's Form 7460 for construction of its 
Development. R. Exh. at 201 -02 (Plaintiff Exh. 84), 
May 31, 2007 - Esvelt-Siegford sends the ,,AA additional plans it had requested 
concerning the taxiway construction. She also informs the FAA that an environmental checklist 
is not needed because the County completed, and the FAA approved, the EA for the full-length 
taxiway shown in the County's ALP depicting Alternative 2(B). R. Exh. at 203 (Plaintiff Exh. 
88); Trial Tr. at 757:13-759:4, On July 2, 2007, Esvelt•Seigford emails the FAA to follow upj 
and the FAA confirms that it has received and reviewed the complete taxiway plans and 
SilverWing can move forward with the taxiway construction. R Exh. at 204 (Plaintiff Exh. 89); 
Trial Tr. at 762:3-763:19. 
While the County ignores this evidence, the jury did not. See R. at 5702. This clearly 
amounts to substantial and competent evidence of SilverWing's reasonable reliance5 on the 
5 Both Appellant and Amicus cite Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. I 32, 127 Idaho 112, 898 P.2d 
43 (1995), as an example where this Court did not apply the doctrine or promissory estoppel to a 
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County's promises. 
c. Silver Wing Presented Substantial Evidence of Damages at Trial. 
The jury was instructed that SilverWing must establish "substantial economic loss" as a 
result of its reliance on the County's promises. R. at 5913. See also Grover v. Wctdsworth, 
147 Idaho 60, 64, 205 P.3d 1196, 1200 (2009). "Reliance damages include expenses reasonably 
related to the purposes of the contract which would not have been incurred but for the contract's 
existence." Becu Const. Co. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 9, 936 P.2d 202, 207 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
At trial, Erick West, SilverWing's damages expert; testified that SilverWing incun-cd a 
total of $5,723,120.00 in reliance damages based on the County's promises. Trial Tr. at 943:17-
944: 15. Of this, SilverWing spent $851,120.00 on building its taxiway in reliance on the 
promises of the County. R. Exh. at 317 (Plaintiff Exh. 177). The County argues that SilverWing 
did not sustain any reliance damages because "nothing has changed and SilverWing's 
development as it stands today is in confonnity with the approved ALP." Appellant Br. at 22. 
This argument ignores the undisputed testimony at trial that SilvcrWing incurred increased costs 
to design and build its taxiway in the location promised by the County; that is, partially on 
government entity due to lack of reasonable reliance. Appellant Br. at 25; Amicos Br. at 20. In 
Brown, a school superintendent made promises to a teacher concerning her employment contract 
but had no actual authority to make the promises. This Court held the teacher could not 
reasonably rely on the promises since Idaho Code § 33-513 "sets out a detailed procedure to be 
followed when a school district seeks to employ professional personnel." Brown, 127 Idaho at 
117- l 8, 898 P.2d 43 , 48-49. In contrast, SilverWing reasonably relied on the County's promises 
based on the actual authority the County delegated to the Airpo1t Manager and Airport Board as 
detailed in Section IV.A.3.a. , infra. 
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Airport property as compared to entirely on SilverWing property. See Trial Tr. at 331 :l l-16 
(McKeown testified "it was a much more expensive taxiway ... you have to build it to a much 
higher leveP'). 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury awarded SilverWing $250;000.00 in 
reliance damages. R. at 5703 . Viewing all of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in 
favor of SilverWing, substantial evidence supports the jury's award. 
3. Idaho's Open Meetings Law Does J:1oJ Bar SilverWing's Promissory Estoppel 
Claim. 
The County asserts Idaho ' s Open Meetings Law bars enforcement of any promises made 
to SilvcrWing by the County's agents, including members of the Airport Board and the Airport 
Manager. See Appellant Br. at 23. In support, the County relies on Idaho Code§ 74-208, which 
provides: 
"ff an action, or any deliberation or decision-making that leads to 
an action, occurs at any meeting which fails to comply with the 
provisions o.t this chapter, such action shall be null and void." 
J.C. § 74-208 (emphasis addc.::d) . The Open Meetings aw does not define "action." ''Where the 
legislature has not provided a definition in the statute, terms in the statute are given their 
common, everyday meanings." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 4 71, 4 77, 163 P .3d 1183, 1189 
(2007). However, "decision" is defined to mean '•any detennination, action, vote or final 
disposition upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, ordinance or measure on which a vote of a 
governing body is required, at any meeting at which a quorum is present, bttt shall 11ot include 
thos~e ministerial or administrative actions necessary to carry out a decision previously adopted 
in a meeting held in compliance with this chapter." LC. § 74-202(1) (emphasis added). 
31 
'"Meeting' means the convening of a governing body of a public agency to make a decision or to 
deliberate toward a decision on any matter." LC. § 74-202(6). See Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 477, 
163 P.3d at 1189 ("Legislative definitions of'tenns included within a statute control and dictate 
the meaning of those terms as used in the statute.") . 
Here, the district court properly held "that Idaho;s Open Meetings law does not render 
[the County's] promises null and void" because the County's promises " were not actions" under 
Idaho Code or, alternatively, they were "administrative actions necessary to cany out a decision 
previously adopted" pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74-202. R. at 5737. This holding is supported by 
substantial evidence and Idaho Law. 
a. The County Delegated Authority to the Airport Manager and Airport 
Board M Act on Airport Matters1 and Their Promises to SilverWing 
Were Not Actions Under Idaho's Open Meetings Law. 
A county, through its ''board of county commissioners) or by agents and officers acting 
under their authority. or authority of law'' has the power to take care of, manage and control 
county property. LC. § § 31-602, 31-604, 31 -807 ( emphasis added). This is in accord with well-
established precedent that a principal may be bound by an agent acting within its express, 
implied or apparent authority.6 Clark v. Gneiting. 95 Idaho 10, 11 -12, 501 P.2d 278, 279-80 
(1972). As explained in Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 479, 708 P .2d 900,902 {1985), express 
and implied authority are both types of actual authority. Express authority is that wh ich the 
principal explicitly grants the agent. Id. Implied authority is that ''which is necessary, usual, and 
proper to accomplish or perform the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. '' 
6 The jury was instructed on Idaho agency law. R. at 5919-24 (Jury Instruction Nos. 11-15). 
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Clark, 95 Idaho at 12, 50 I P .2d at 280. Express authority may be proven with circumstantial 
evidence, and in a case of conflicting evidence, the trier of fact must resolve the "question of the 
nature and extent of the authority of an agent.'' Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 500-01, 
767 P.2d 1272, 1275-76 (Ct. App. 1989). 
SilverWing presented substantial evidence that O'Leary- in his capacity as Airport 
Manager- had actual authority to bind the County on matters related to the Airport, including 
the promises made to SilverWing. Specifically, the Airport Lease signed by the Board of County 
Commissioners and assigned to O'Leary as Tenant (Airpott Manager) details particular 
responsibilities delegated to him by the County, including: 
8. Keep and maintain any and all records required by the County. 
25. Perform administrative and professional managerial duties 
related to planning, organizing, directing, and controlling the 
maintenance, services, and general operation of the Sandpoint 
Airpo1t. He shall work in conjunction with the Sandpoint Airport 
Commission and the Bonner County Commissioners. 
26. O'Leary] shall act as a coordinator between Bonner County 
and prospective tenants, contractors, federal and state agencies 
pertaining to the improvement, protection, operation, and 
maintenance of Airp011 properties and attendant facilities. 
R. Exh. at 23, 26 (Plaintiff Exh. 3 at 7, 10). This corresponds with O'Leary's understanding of 
his duties as Airport Manager, which included representing the County to all agencies (including 
the FAA), liaise and correspond with the FAA and attend Airport Board meetings. Trial Tr. at 
1082:5-1083 :21. o• Leary was also responsible for maintaining a record of correspondence with 
the FAA and the ALP files, including a copy of the most recent ALP. Trial Tr. at 
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1095:10- 1096:7. SilverWing's un.detstanding of O ' Leary' s responsibilities and authority 
correspond with O'Leary' s actual authority. Trial Tr. at 288:22-289:6 (McKeown); 579:25-580:2 
(Van Dyk); 729:10-12 (Esvelt-Sicgford). As held by the district court, " [s]uch evidence is 
substantial, suppotts the jury's verdict, and is in hannony with Idaho 's Open Meeting Laws." 
R. at 5738. 
SilverWlng also presented evidence that the Board of County Commissioners, in its 
"Resolution to Improve Operation of the Sandpoint Airport and to Create an Airpo1t Advisory 
Board" ("Airpoit Board Resolution"), delegated auth01ity to the Airport Board to, inter alia, 
supervise the management and improvement of airpo1t operations, fonnulate an annual Airport 
budget and serve as a "communications conduit for Airport related matters," including acting as 
a " liaison between the Airport users and governmental officials.' ' R. Exh. at 351-54 (Defendant 
Exh. A 7). The Airport Board s actions are only "subject to approval by the Board of County 
Commissioners when such approval is deemed necessary."7 
In this case, the jury found that the County, through its agents, 8 made promises to 
' See Respondent's Motion to A11gment Record, filed F ebrnary 1, 2018, attaching a full copy of 
Defendant Exhibit A7, including page two. Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Augment 
(Febmary 6, 2018). 
8 The County ignores the district court ' s holding that, based on the evidence at trial, the County 
expressly delegated its authority to O;Leary and the Airpo1t Board concerning Airport matters, 
R. at 5737-38. Instead, the COlmly asserts, "SilverWing has introduced no evidence of actual 
authority and apparent authority is insufficient to suppott SilvcrWingis claim of promissory 
cstoppel against the County." Appellant Br. at 25. The County then analyzes case law specific to 
apparent authority. Id. at 25~27; see also Amicus Br. at 20, 33~35. Given the substantial evidence 
presented by SilverWing regarding actual authority of County agents concerning the Airport, and 
the requirement that all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom be viewed in favor of 
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SilverWing concerning the ALP upon which to base its Development. R. at 5738. As explained 
by the district court: 
[S]ucll a promise is not an action or decision that required a vote or 
final disposition upon a motion, proposal,. resolution, order, 
ordinance, or measure. Defendant's promises to Plaintiff were not 
promises that it would change the management or control of the 
airp011. Defendant did not promise Plaintiff that it would, at a later 
time, vote to adopt a different airpot1 layout plan. Defendant's 
agent promised that Plaintiffs development plans were based on 
the correct airport layout plan. Defendant has not identified any 
law, rule, or ordinance requiring that the Airport Board take a vote 
before individual members (or agents) can make promises or 
assurances to parties with which it is negotiating regarding 
information within its charge. 
R. at 5738. Therefore, the County's promises to SilverWing were not actions under Idaho Code 
§ 74-208. And, even if those promises amounted to ~~actions,' ' they were administrative actions 
necessary to carry out the terms of: O'Leary's obligations as Airport Manager under his Airport 
Lease or the Airport Board's obligations to the County pursuant to the Airport Board Resolution. 
The doctrine of ratification is also relevant. The jury was instructed that even if an 
••agent acts outside the scope of authority/' the principal may still be bound by the agent's 
actions through ratification. R. at 5924. "Although the effect of a ratified act is essentially the 
same as an act that was authorized ... ratification takes place after the act has occurred while 
authodzation must occur before conduct arises." Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 
122 Idaho 47, 54, 830 P.2d 1185, 1192 (1992). 
SilverWing, case law where coutts deny estoppel claims in the context of an agent having 
apparent (and not actual) authority is inapplicable. 
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Ratification by a munici.pality can be established by any action or inaction that amounts 
to an approval of its agent ' s actions. •or example, in PunxsutC1wney Mun. Airport Awh.. v. 
Lelloc:k, 2000 PA Super 18, 745 A.2d 666 (2000), a tenant (Lellock) made improvements to a 
hanger he rented from the Punxsutawney Municipal Airport Authority ("PMAA") based upon an 
oral promise from the PMAA chairman (Chango) that the improvement costs would extend the 
Lease period and be offset against rents. Id. at 668. PMAA later took the position that the oral 
contract was invalid because it was not a contract signed by the chairman or approved hy a board 
vote. Id. Testimony at trial demonstrated that "individuals relied upon [Mr, Chango's] 
representations since [he] operated PMAA with full authority" and 'the airport was in need of 
repair at the time, and any capital improvements were welcon1e by PMAA." Id. at 669. Lellock 
also ''showed his plans for improving the hangar to everyone at the airport, and everyone knew 
[hel was making them.1 Id. at 669. Based on this evidence, the jury determined Lhe agreement 
was enforceable ' 'through the doctrines of ratification or estoppel." Id. On appeal, the court 
observed, "a municipality like a private corporation . . . may be estopped to deny the authority of 
its agents to act if it has the power to act." Id. at 671 . PMAA board members " watched and 
waited" as Lellock made improvements to the hangar over the course of several years, and 'no 
board member ever approached [LeUock] to prevent him from continuing with his plans to 
improve the hangar." Id. Since the elements of estoppel were present and "'municipal inaction, 
plus acceptance of benefits, may constitute ratification, ' the appellate court held that the district 
cou1t correctly permitted the jury to determine if a valid oral contract existed. Id. at 672. 
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The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those in Punxswawaney. Namely, 
following the promises made by County agents, the County's actions (and inaction), while 
SilverWing p lanned its Development and built the taxiway based on the County's promises, 
ratified the promises. See, e.g. , R. at 5739 ('"Defendant was aware that multiple airport layout 
plans were discussed and circulated through its agent; Mr. O'Leary.''). Therefore, even if the jury 
determined the County' s agents d1d not have actual authority for the promises made to 
SilverWing, SilverWing presented substantial evidence of ratification of the promises so us to 
provide an alternative basis on which the jury could have reasonably based its verdict. 
b. Priflciples of Substantial Justice and Fair Play Support tlze .Tury 1s 
Verdict in Favor of Silver Wing. 
The district cou1t held that even if the County's promises were actions or decisions, 
"prornissory estoppel is nevertheless applicable" based on equitable principles. R. at 5737-39. 
Promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy for damages arising out of good-faith reHance on a 
promise. "In its broadest and most general signification, equity denotes the spirit and habit of 
fairness , justness, and right dealing ... the rnlc of doing to all oth1:.m., as we desire them to do to 
us." Climax, UC v. Snake River Oncology o./E. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho 791, 796, 24 1 P.3d 
964, 969 (2010) ( citing Land v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 744, 752 (Fed.CL 1993)). As 
recognized by the district cou1t, estoppel is available against government bodies where "required 
by notions of justice and fair play." R. at 5738-39 (citing Idaho Wool Growers Ass ·n, inc. v, 
State, 154 Idaho at 723, 302 P Jd at 348). 
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Moreover, the "modem trend" is to apply estoppel "to prevent unjust enriclunent and to 
accord fairness to those who bargain with the agents of municipalities for the promises of the 
municipalities.'; Wiggins v, Barrett & Assocs., Inc. , 295 Or. 679, 692, 669 P.2d 1132, 1142 
(1983); see also Charleston Cty. v. Nat'l Adver. Co., 292 S.C. 416, 418, 357 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1987) 
('"The acts of u government agent that arc within the proper scope of his authority may give rise 
to estoppel against a municipality.'); Aranosian Oil Co. v. City of Portsmouth, 136 N.H. 57, 59, 
612 A.2d 357, 358 (N.H. 1992); US Ecology, Inc. v. State o.f Cal(fotnia, 92 Cal. App 4th 113, 
13 I, 11 I Cal. Rptr, 2d 689 (2001) (p1inciples of promissory cstoppel «apply to clahns against the 
government, particularly where the application of the doctrine would furtber public policies and 
prevent injustice."); Bishop v. City cl Colwnbi(t, 401 S.C. 651, 666, 73"8 S.E.2d 255, 262~63 
(Ct. App. 20 13). 
In this case, a jury comprised of Bonner County citizens determined that Bonner County 
agents made promises that SilverWing relied on to its detriment. As the district court stated, 
H[n]otions of justice and fair play are offended, and greatly diminished, if Defendant's promises 
are unenforceable. Defendant accepted the benefit conferred upon it by the Plaintiffs 
development: building the west side taxiway on County property." R. at 5739. Moreover, it 
would be manifestly unjust and unfair for this Court to nullify the jury's verdict which found that 
the County's agents made promises to SilverWing and that SilverWing's reliance on such 
promises by these individuals was reasonable and justified. 
Further, Amicus' concern that promissory estoppel should never apply to a government 
entity "because it is inconsistent with sound, efficient and transparent governmental operations" 
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and could have a "chilling effect" is misplaced. See Amicus Br. at 28 , Relying on Terrazas v. 
Blaine Cty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 207 P.3d 169 (2009); Amicus claims that 
Idaho docs not ''apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel or quasi~estoppel against a local 
government entity," Amicus Br. at 17-19. This Court specifically declined to accept such a rule 
in Terrazas. 147 Idaho at 201 , 207 P.3d at 177. Moreover, Terrazas does not compel such a 
result here because the promise at issue and person making that promise in Terrazas are 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
In Terrazas, a county planner opined C'subject to further examination by the Board'') that 
the Terrazases ' property was located within a cettain district and that the Terrazases relied on 
that opinion to incur significant expenses in preparing a subdivision application, Id. at 196, 207 
P.3d at 172. When the Terrazases' application was denied because the planner's opinion was 
inaccurate, they argued that the County was estopped from denying their application. Id. at 200, 
207 P .3d at 176. This Court disagreed, stating that if it applied ' the doctrine of estoppel in the 
i 1stant case, then all future boards of commissioners in similar circumstances wo1.1ld be estopped 
from disagreeing with the opinions of staff members simply because a landowner expended 
money in reliance on those promises.'' Id. at 201 , 207 P.3d at 177 (emphasis added). In contrast 
to staff members with no actual authority, here the Airp01i Manager and members ot the Airport 
Board were delegated actual authority by the County on Airpoti matters. Moreover, nothing in 
any of the repeated and consistent promises to SilverWing by the County indicated that they 
were ' 'subject to further review." Authorized agents must have the ability to bind counties on 
matters within the scope of their authorization. Indeed; to hold otherwise would create chaos in 
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the day-to-day operation of Idaho 's counties. Accordingly, this is the appropriate case for the 
Court to uphold the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against a county. 
4. Idaho's Statute of Frauds Docs Not Bar SilverWing's CJaim. 
Under Idaho 's statute of frauds, an " agreement that by its terms is not to be perfom1ed 
within a year from the making thereof' is invalid unless in w1iting. LC. § 9-505. [E]ven if a 
contract appears on its face to anticipate perfom,ance for more than one year, it may fall outside 
the statute if it is subject to a condition or contingency that could occur within a year, tenninating 
further perfon-nance," Gen. Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 856, 979 P.2d 
1207, 1214 (1999) (quoting Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 110 Idaho 347, 348, 715 P.2d 1017, 
1018 (Ct. App.1986)). Idaho has construed its " statute of frauds narrowly." Frantz v. Parke. 
111 Idaho 1005 1008 729 P.2d 1068 1071 (Ct. App. 1986) (" We have allowed enforcement of 
an oral contract made for an indefinite period, to be dete1mincd by a stated futuro event; if it was 
possible-albeit unlikely-that the stated event could occur within a year.") . 
The County argues that the statute of frauds bars its promises to SilverWing because 
•'S ilverWing seeks to bind the County for more than one year" and that "one year after the 
alleged promises were made, nothing had changed. '' Appellant Br. at 30. The County cites one 
sentence of McKeown' s testimony confirming that the runway had not moved to support this 
argument. Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 471 :] 7-472:3). But, testimony about the movement (or lack 
thereof) of the runway is irrelevant to SilverWinis promissory estoppel claim. As detailed 
above, SilverWing' s promissory cstoppel claim was based on the County's promises concerning 
which ALP to rely on for its Development and the proper location of SilverWing' s taxiway. 
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Moreover, the statute of frauds does not apply to the County's promises because they are 
subject to a contingency that could have occurred within one year. As noted by the district court, 
a number of contingencies could have prevented SilverWing from continuing with the 
Development and which would have then discharged the County' s performance of its promises. 
R. at 5745. For example, SilverWing could have ceased to do business or sold the property or 
the County could have approved a new ALP. Id. As such, the "statute does not apply to 
Defendant's promises." Id. 
5. The County's Statute of Limitations Argument is a Red-Herring Reiected by 
the District Court and Should be Rejected by this Court Too. 
There is a four-year statllte of limitations for actions ''upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument of writing.'' LC. § 5-217. "A cause of action for breach 
of contract accrues upon breach for limitations purposes." See Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 
51 I, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating statute of limitations began to run when 
plaintiff became aware of the breach). SilverWing fil .d its complaint on May 11~ 2012 and, 
therefore, any claim that accrued before May 11, 2008 is time barred. 
The County argues that the statute of limitations bars SilverWing's claim because in 
May 2007, ''SilverWing's engineer Corrie Esvelt-Siegford knew that the AA's letter responding 
to SilverWing' s Fom, 7460 Application (R. at PTE 84) raised red flags" concerning "the FAA's 
position on the development'' and specifically the fact that the Development involved residential 
use. Appellant Br. at 30; see also R. Exh. at 201-202 (Plaintiff Exh. 84). As the evidence at 
trial makes clear, this is both misleading and incorrect. 
4 1. 
The County's promises concerned which ALP to rely on and the proper location of the 
taxiway, not that the FAA approved residential hangars in SllverWing's Development. McKeown 
testified that SilverWing first learned in April 2009, not 2007, that the ALP the County provided 
SilverWing in 2006 was not the F AA~approved plan; he testified he "was shocked and infuriated" at 
the news. Trial Tr. at 413 :18-414:21. The Court must view this evidence and all inferences 
therefrom in favor of Sil verWing. See Schroeder, 151 Idaho at 4 76, 259 P .3d at 622. 
Accordingly, this Court (like district court below (R. at 5743)) should find that SilverWing1s 
promissory estoppel claim was timely. 
6. The Idaho Constitution Does Not Bar SilvcrWing's Claim. 
The County asserts that because Article VIII, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution and ldaho 
Code § 31-605 prohibit a county and other municipalities from loaning money or giving credit, 
the County could not make promises to SilverWing that were unsupported by consideration 
(promises that the County labels "gratuitous"). See IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (County shall 
not lend or pledge credit or "become responsible for any debt, contract or liability of any 
individual , association or corporation.''); LC. § 31-605 ("No county must in any manner loan or 
give its credit to or in aid of any person, association or corporation unless it is expressly 
authorized by law so to do."). This argument defies common sense. As held by the district 
court, the County's promises to SilverWing about the coffect ALP and location to build its taxiway, 
"in no reasonable view of the evidence, were promises to loan money or extend credit." R. at 5746. 
Likewise, the County's argwnent concerning Article VIII, § 3, of the Idaho Constitution 
also fails. This section prohibits the County from incutTing ' indebtedness, or liability" exceeding 
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its revenues, without voter approval. IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3. The purpose of Atticle Vlll, 
§ 3 is "to maintain the credit of the state and its political subdivisions by keeping them on a cash 
basis ... and to prevent indebtedness incurred in one year from being paid from the income of a 
futw·e year without voter approval." Michael C. Moore, The Idaho Constitution and Local 
Governments - Selected Topics, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 417 (l 995). Thusi when a city attempted to 
issue bonds without a vote of the electors and without a provision for levying a special tax to pay 
the ptincipal and interest on the bonds, such action violated Atticle, VIII, § 3. See Feil v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 693 (1912). 
In contrast to Feil, the County's promises to SilverWing concerning the ALP upon 
which SilverWing should base its Development and the location of its taxiway do not violate this 
section of the Idaho Constitution because such promises were not monetary obligations incurred 
by the County. Moreover, the County presented no evidence at trial that it incurred any specific 
liability to Silv~rWing that would exceed its ability to pay in the year in which it was entered. 
See Greater Boise Auditorium Dist. v. Frazier, 159 Idaho 266, 273, 360 P.3d 275, 282 (2015), 
reh 'g denied (Nov. 23 , 20 15) ("The relevant detem1ination under Article VIII, section 3 is 
whether the governmental subdivision presently bound itself to a liability greater than it has 
fonds to pay for in the year in which it bound itself.''). For the same reasons, Amicus' argument 
that Article VIII, § 3 should bar SilverWing's promissory estoppel claim also fails. See Amicus 
Br. at 23-25. Thus, the district court's finding that the Idaho Constitution does not bar 
SilverWing's promissory estoppel claim should be affim1ed. 
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B. The District Court Properly Awarded SilverWing Attorney Fees on its Promissory 
Estoppcl Claim Under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
The County appeals the district court's award of $486,337.03 in fees to SilverWing under 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), asserting SilverWing's promissory estoppel claim did not arise from a 
commercial transaction. The County' s argument is unsupported by Idaho law and the. facts of 
the case. As the district comt held, "a commercial transaction is the gravamen of Plaintiffs 
promiss01y estoppel claim' and ''served as the basis for Plaintiff's cJajm," R. at 5852. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides that ''in any civil action to recover on ... any 
commercial transaction unll;}sS otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a 
reasonable attorney's fee ... " A "commercial transaction'' is defined by the Idaho Code as "all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." LC. § 12-120(3); see also 
Stevens v. Eyer, 161 Idaho 407, 412, 387 P.3d 75. 80 (2016) (quoting Dictionary.com, which 
defines the adjective ''commercial" to mean "prepared, done, or acting with sole or chief 
emphasis on salability, profit, or success'' or ''able to yield or make a profit."). 
"Thus, whether a party can recover attomey fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) 
depends on whether the gravamen of a claim is a commercial transaction." Sims v. Jacobson, 
157 Idaho 980, 985,342 P.3d 907,912 (2015). "A gravamen is •the material or signittcant part 
of a grievance or complaint.''' Id. "(C]ourts analyze the gravamen claim by claim.'' Id. "To 
determine whether the significant part of a claim is a commercial transaction, the court must 
analyze whether a commercial transaction (I) is integral to the claim and (2) constitutes the basis 
of the patty's theory of recovery on that claim.;; Id. In addition, "each party to the transaction 
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111ust enter the transaction for a commercial purpose.'1 Carrillo v. Boise 11re Co., 152 Idaho 741 , 
756,274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012). 
While no Idaho case specifically addresses whether a claim for promissory estoppel may 
be the basis for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the authority to do so is 
apparent. This Court has given broad meaning to the term "transaction" and, importantly, has 
held that. "ldaho Code § '12-120(3) does not require that there be a contract between the parties 
before the statute is applied; the statute only requires that there be a commercial transaction.' 
Univ. of Idaho Found., Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc., 146 Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 
(2008) . "Where a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by 
section 12- 120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of the statute." Idaho Transp. Dep't., 
159 Idaho at 141 , 357 P.3d at 866. The Cou1t's inquiry under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), therefore, 
focuses on the nature of the claim and on the allegations rather than on the stated cause of action. 
The County cites to Brower v, EJ. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 
345 (1990), as support for its argument that SilverWing's promissory estoppel claim did not arise 
out of a commercial transaction. Appellant Br. at 39. In Brower, the plaintiff sued the 
manufacturer (DuPont) of an experimental herbicide that plaintiff JJurchased from a third party. 
The herbicide damaged the plaintiff's crops, and he sued DuPont for fraud, alleging its 
representations induced his reliance, causing him to purchase and apply the herbicide to his land, 
resulting in damages. Defendant DuPont prevailed on a statute ot limitations defense, and the 
distiict court awarded it attorney fees. This Court reversed on appeal, concluding: 
The only commercial transaction involved is the purchase by 
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Brower of the DuPont chemicals from a local co-op. If there is any 
contract involved in this case it is not a contract surrotmding that 
purchase; but one that might have been implied from the facts 
surrounding the relationship between DuPont and Brower_ We 
cannot say that this case revolves around a commercial transaction 
sufficient to implicate the terms of LC. § 12- 120(3). 
Btower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792 P.2d at 349. 
This Couii recently distinguished Brower tn Bryan Trucking, Inc. v. Gier, 160 Idaho 422. 
374 P.3d 585 (2016) . In Brycin Trucking, plaintiff Bryan rncking alleged he purchased a 
commercial tmck based on representations made by Terry Gier (Gier), a third party whose 
company (Gier Jamrner' s Diesel Repair, LLC) had serviced the truck . Because Gier and his 
company had overhauled the truck s motor and perfon11ed other maintenance, Gier, acting as an 
agent for the seller (Ring), was "able to answer numerous questions Bryan posed about the 
truck." id. at 424, 374 P.3d at 587. The truck later experienced mechanical problems, and Bryan 
Trucking incnrred damages for its repair. id. Bryan Trucking sued both the seller (Ring) and 
Gier for fraud and asserted contract-based claims againsl the seller, Id. All the claims were 
dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Id. Thereafter, the district court awarded Gier 
$26,496.66 for his attomey fees under Idaho Code § 12- 120(3). The relevant issue on appeal was 
whether a commercial transaction supported an award of attorney fees to Gier_ Id. The cou1t 
reasoned that although Gier was not a party to the sale contract or a named defendant on other 
claims, plaintiff Bryan Trucking did allege " that Gier was a party to the commercial transaction9 
9 Justice Eismann clarified that I.C. § 12-120(3) "does not require an action to recover on a 
commercial transaction. It requires that the claim be an action to recover in a commercial 
transaction." Bryan Trucking, 160 Idaho at 428, 3 7 4 P .3d at 591 . 
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when it alleged that Gier was Ring's agent, had defrauded Bryan Trucking, and owed Bryan 
Trucking a duty. Id. at 426, 374 P.3d at 589. 
Likewise, in this case, the basis of SilverWing' s promissory estoppel claim is a 
commercial transaction. The County's promises, on which Silve,·Wrng relied, related to the 
SilverWing Development, including its taxiway adjacent to the Airport. In addition, both patties 
had a commercial purpose in their transaction. SilverWing relied on the County' s promises in 
developing its commercial hangar home project, and the County made promises to Si lverWing 
for a commercial purpose, i.e., the potential to obtain increased tax revenue and jobs for the 
County. Sol Pusey ("'Pusey"), a former member of the Airpo1t Board, testified at trial that the 
Airpo1t Board was "excited" about SilverWing1s plans to build its taxiway in the location 
consistent with ALP Alternative 2(B) because it would make the airport better 'and SilverWing 
would generate «about three qumi.ers of a million dollars a year in tax revenue to the 
County/City. And that would take care of a lot of our funding problems." Tdal Tr. at 
501 :24-502: 15; see also R. Exh. at 395 (Defendant Exh. C49) (emphasis added) (Pusey testified 
"the Airport Board approved the Westside taxiway and Silverwings because it would improve 
the ain,ort and bring jobs and visitors to Bonner County."); Tdal Tr. at 509:3-10. This is 
consistent with McKcown' s testimony that, on December 11 , 2007, the Airpo1t Board told him 
that building SilverWing's taxiway in accord with the layout of Alternative 2(8) "was impottant 
to them to spur that growth on the side of the rnnwa_y." Trial Tr. at 332;14-18 (emphasis added). 
Together, this testimony provides substantial evidence to confinn the County had a commercial 
purpose in making pmmises to SilverWing concerning its Development; namely to bting 
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increased tax re enue and jobs, improve the Airport, and spur growth on the west side of the 
runway. Sec Stevens, 161 Idaho at 412, 387 P.3d at 80 (stating 'commercial' means prepared, 
done, or acting wit11 sole or chief emphasis on salability, profit, or success .... ). 
The County asserts that any " value" received for its promises would equal consideration 
and, thus; negate SilverWing' s claim for promissory estoppel. Appellant Br- at 40. While the 
County certainly hopc;d the Development would increase growth, job · and tax revenues, 
SilverWing did not offer growth, jobs and tax revenues as consideration' for the promises made 
by the County. Moreover the -.ounty did not receive consideration for its promises under the 
TTFA b1:::cause the County's promises were unrelated to the subject matter of the TTFA. See 
Section TV.A.1 1 supra; see also R. at 5852 (district court disagreeing with County's 
consideration argument and stating, " [w]here there is consideration for a contract between parties 
regarding airport access for a few, that consideration (and contract) is not related enough to 
promises regarding the location and composition of development property such that the 
promising party can shield itself from liability.") . 
As aptly summarized by the district court: 
Here, there is a commercial transaction that comprises the 
gravamen of the promissory estoppel claim. To begin, there is no 
dispute that Plaintiff and Defendant were parties in a contractual 
relationship with respect to the TTF A. The tenns of the TTF A 
controlled access between Plaintiff's air hangar-home development 
and Defendant's airport. The evidence admitted at trial showed that 
Plaintiff and Defendant were motivated by the desire for profit and 
growth. Before and after the execution of the TTFA, Defendant' s 
agent made promises to Plaintiff about where the runway and 
taxiway should be. Plaintiff reasonably reHed on those promises to 
its detriment. Defendant's promises and Plaintift's subseguent 
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reliance comprise the commercial transaction. 
The commercial transaction, and commerGial r~lationship between 
the pa1ties, is integral to Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. 
Without the TTF A, and corresponding development, tile parties 
would never have been in a position to make promises to one 
another about ancillary matters that would have foreseeably 
induced detrimental reliance. 
The parties entered the transaction for a commercial purpose. 
Plaintiff relied on Defendant's promises in developing its 
commercial hangar-home project, tacitly to facilitate its 
completion. Defendant made the promise to Plaintiff for a 
commercial purpose; Defendant' s commercial purpose was the 
pecuniary benefits of increased tax revenue, approximately 
$750,000.00 a year. Accordingly, the Court holds that a 
commercial transaction is the gravamen of Plaintiff s promissory 
cstoppcl claim and that it served as the basis for Plaintiffs claim. 
R. at 5852 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). This decision is sound and should be 
affinned. 
C. The County is Not Entitled to An Award of Its Fees. 
Despite the fact that the jury rendered a verdict entirely in SilverWing's favor and that 
Judge Christensen methodically considered and reviewed all of the same arguments presented by 
the County herein to conclude that SilverWing s promissory estoppcl claim was well founded, 
the County asserts that it is entitled to an award of its attorney fees and costs in the trial below 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. The County' s request is premised on the condition that this 
Court reverse the judgment below. Appellant Br. at 41 . Regardless of whether this Court 
reverses or affirms the judgment below, there is no basis for an award of fees and costs to the 
County pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. There is simply no evidence for this Court to conclude 
that SilverWing '"acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law;, or that it "brought, pursued or 
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defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation' ' its successful promissory estoppel 
claim. See Coeur d 'Alene 2'ribe v. Dertneyi 161 Idaho 508, 387 P.3d 761, 778- 79 (2015); City of 
Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 908, 277 P.3d 353,355 (2012). 
The County's secondary basis for a request of attomey foes is equally unavailing. The 
County claims it is entitled to its fees under the TTFA because SilverWing's promissory estoppel 
claim is "based, at least in part, on Exhibit A to the TTF[ A]." Appellant Br. at 41-42. As 
demonstrated above in Section IV.A.1 , supra, the promises that form the basis of SilverWints 
successful promissory estoppel claim against the County are not encompassed within the TTF A. 
Accordingly, this Court- like the district court- should reject the Cottnty's argument on this 
point and decline to award it fees and costs at trial and in these proceedings. 
V. OBJECTION TO SCOPE OF AMICUS BRIEF 
This Cou1t, as a matter of first impression, recently held that it 'will not consider 
arguments advanced by amicus curiae which have not been raised by the pa1ties." Schweitzer 
Basin Water Co. v. Schweit~er Fire Dist. , No. 44249, 2017 WL 5710684, at *2- 3, P.3d - -
(Idaho Nov. 28; 2017). This follows United States Supreme Court precedent establishmg that 
· arguments not raised by the parties or considered by lower courts will not be considered on 
appeal. See, e,g., F. T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4, 133 S.Ct. 
1003, 185 .Ed.2d 43 (2013) (when asked by an amicus curiae lo consider an argument not 
taised directly by the parties, the Court refused, stating ''Because this argument was not raised by 
the parties or passed on by the lower courts, we do not consider it ); Watkins Co. , LLC v. Estate 
of Storrns, 161 Idaho 683, 685, 390 P.3d 409, 41 l (2017) (''This Court will not consider issues 
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raised for the first time on appeal"). "An amicus must take a case as he finds it without 
attempting to inject new issues or to tailor the case to suit his needs." Blackburn v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 85, 90, 697 P.2d 425, 430 (1985) (citing Bogert v. Kinzer, 
93 Idaho 515, 517-18, 465 P.2d 639, 641-42 (1970)). 
Here, Amicus improperly goes beyond the arguments and issued raised by the County in 
two ways. First, Amicus challenges numerous jury instructions either given or requested and 
refused by the district court. Amicus Br. at 32 ( •at trial the jury should have been instructed as 
to how a binding obligation can be made by a county"); 33 ("the District Court erred in failing to 
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instruct the jury as to" statements made by the County outside a duly noticed Open Meeting); 
37-39 ("The District Court failed to properly instruct the jury as to how a county can lawfully 
enter into a binding agreement"); 40 (the district court tmed in rejecting Jury Instruction No. 67). 
Although the County had the opportunity to (and did) object to all of the jury instructions offered 
or given and request additional instructions that it deemed appropriate (Trial Tr, at 1448-1475), 
the County did not appeal the district court's ruling on any jury instruction nor has the County 
addressed jury instructions in its Appellant's Brie[ As such, the County cannot object to any 
jury instruction either given or offered and refused for the first time in its Reply Bctef or at oral 
argument. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P .3d 120, 122 (2005) (" A reviewing court 
looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are the arguments 
and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief"). 
And, correspondingly, this Court should not consider Amicus' obje.ctions and arguments related 
to any jury instruction used or refused by the district court. Bogert, 93 ldaho at 517-18, 465 P.2d 
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at 641-42. See also Oregon Shonline R.R. Co. v. City ofClntbbuck, 93 Idaho 815,817,474 P.2d 
244, 246 (1970) (questions not raised by the pleadings nor argued or decided by the lower court 
"will not be considered for the first time on appeal"). 
Second, Amicus offers arguments about FAA preemption. Amicus Br. at 35-36, 40. This 
Court did not grant Amicus- an association of counties- permission to appear in this case to 
provide the Cou1t with FAA expertise. Nor does it have any. More importantly, while the 
County made federal preemption arguments below, it did not appeal this issue or raise it in its 
Appellant 's Brief. Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider Amicus' federal 
preemption argument. See Schweitzer Basin Water Co., 2017 WL 57 10684, at *2- 3 (Court "will 
not consider arguments advanced by amicz.1$ cwiae which have not been raised by the parties"). 10 
VI. SILVERWING IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
SilverWing seeks costs and attorney fees on appeal as authorized by I.A.R. 40 and 
l.A.R. 41. Pursuant to LA.R. 4l(a), SilverWing has designated the award of attorney fees on 
appeal as an issue on appeal. SilverWing bases its claim for fees on Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as 
the prevailing pmty in a commercial transaction~ which applies with equal measure at hial and on 
appeal. See Idaho Transp. Dep 't., 159 Idaho at I 42, 357 P .3d at 867 ( 'When a party prevails at 
both trial and on appeal, and that party received an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-120(3) at the trial level and the award is affirmed on appeal, that party is also entitled 
to an award of attorney fees for the appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3)' ) . 
10 Amicus also appears to address arguments concerning the County's motion for summary 
judgment and motion for judgment on the pleadings. Amicus Br. at 13-15. However, the County 
has only appealed the decision on its JNOV Motion. 
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VU. CONCLUSION 
A promise, made by one with authority, must be honored. Enforcing such a promise, 
when reliance thereon has caused significant economic injury, will not cause county 
governments in Idaho to fall apart. Far from it - enforcing such promises will ensure certainty in 
dealing with county agents and guaranty that the day-to-day operation of county affafrs can 
proceed smoothly and efficiently. 
The record before this Cou1t provides substantial and competent evidence to support the 
jury's condusion that SilverWing reasonably relied on promises made by the County to its 
detriment and was entitled to an award of $250,000.00 in damages. Moreover, the district court 
applied reason to conclude that the gravamen of SiiverWing's promissory estoppel claim is a 
commercial transaction and, therefore, SilverWing is entitled to its attorney foes and costs under 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3). As such, the judgment below should be AFFIRMED, and this Court 
should award SilverWing its attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2018. 
GIVENS PURS EY LLP 
~~ 
Amber N. Dina 
Attorneys for Silver Wing at Sandpoint, LLC 
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